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Looking to Purpose: An Examination of Statutory 
Interpretation in Denaturalization Cases 
A. Remi Balogun* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Dialogue about immigration and citizenship is often framed in political 
terms. This approach is logical as politicians are responsible for setting the 
immigration policies of the nation.1 But beyond this basic logic, 
immigration is political because of its impact on people and its 
implications on our conceptions of belonging and humanity.2 Imagine that 
after a lengthy process,3 you become a citizen of the United States. It then 
comes to light that you made a misrepresentation during the naturalization 
process. The misrepresentation in question, is not one that would have 
changed whether you were granted citizenship.  
Materiality is a legal concept that captures the influence and impact of a 
particular fact on a legal outcome. In the situation described above, the 
misrepresentation would not have impacted your acquisition of 
citizenship, as such, it is immaterial. Denaturalization is “the process by 
which a government deprives a naturalized citizen of all rights, duties, and 
protections of citizenship.”4 The immigration laws which govern whether 
individuals must leave the country or lose their citizenship are particularly 
 
* J.D. Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (2018).  
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (giving Congress the right to establish uniform naturalization 
laws); See also Katherine Fennelly, Kathryn Pearson & Silvana Hackett, The US Congressional 
Immigration Agenda: Partisan Politics, Policy Stalemate and Political Posturing, 41 J. ETHNIC & 
MIGRATION STUD. 1412 (2015) (discussing congressional immigration action between 1993 and 
2012). 
2. Bill Ong Hing, Ethics, Morality, and Disruption of U.S. Immigration Laws, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 
981, 982 (2015) (“[E]nforcement of U.S. immigration laws over the past twenty years should make us 
wonder about the cost we are willing to pay to enforce the nation’s immigration laws . . . the cost in 
terms of our basic humanity.”). See generally Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera 
Cohn, 5 facts about illegal immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER. (NOVEMBER 3, 2016), 
http://w 
ww.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ (estimating 
11.1 million undocumented immigrants reside in the United States as of 2015). 
3. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV.’S, M-476 A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 
(2016) (explaining that potential applicants must have permanent resident status for three or five years 
before they can even begin the application process). 
4. Denaturalization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
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known for their elevated stakes.5  
For a time, the law governing whether an immaterial misrepresentation 
could result in the loss of your citizenship and the requirement that you 
leave the country depended upon where you resided.6 In United States v. 
Maslenjak (Maslenjak I), 7 the Sixth Circuit held that proof of the 
materiality of a false statement was not a requirement to sustain a 
conviction for knowingly procuring naturalization contrary to law under 
the criminal denaturalization statute 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).8 Section 1425 
applies to those who “knowingly procure” naturalization “contrary to 
law.”9 The Sixth Circuit determined that the statute itself did not contain a 
requirement of materiality.10 
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation stood in contrast with the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Puerta and its progeny, 11 all of 
which read a requirement of materiality into § 1425(a).12 In Puerta the 
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Kungys v. United States,13 a Supreme Court 
decision interpreting the civil denaturalization provision, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(a).14  
At first glance, the results of the Ninth Circuit decision in Puerta and 
the Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak differ due to the interpretative approaches 
 
5. Immigration and Nationality Act – Aggravated Felony – Luna Torres v. Lynch, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 477 (2016) (discussing impacts of deportation and aggravated felonies). 
6. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924 (2017) (resolving circuit split created by 
the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Maslenjak). See also Gerald Seipp, Federal Case Summaries, 93 
No. 17 INTERPRETER RELEASES Art. 16, Apr. 25, 2016 (describing this circuit split). 
7. 821 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
8. Id. at 682. 
9. Id.  
10. Id., “Based on the plain language of the statute as well as the overall statutory scheme for 
denaturalization, we hold that proof of a material false statement is not required to sustain a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).” 
11. 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992). 
12. See e.g., United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1537 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Aladekoba, 61 F. App’x. 27, 28 (4th Cir. 
2003) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Agyemang, 230 F.3d 1354, (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished 
table opinion); United States v. Agunbiade, 172 F.3d 864 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 1999) (unpublished table 
opinion). 
13. 485 U.S. 759 (1988). 
14. Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1301 (stating “Further, the government agrees with Puerta that § 1425(a) 
implies a materiality requirement similar to the one used in the denaturalization context. This position 
finds support in Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988), the 
leading denaturalization case. . ..”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/17
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chosen. The Ninth Circuit utilized reasoning from a prior court decision on 
a similar issue, while the Sixth Circuit relied on a reading of the plain 
language. However, the Supreme Court in Maslenjak v. United States 
(Maslenjak II), 15 took an approach similar to the Sixth Circuit and looked 
to the text of the statute. But despite the similar interpretive approach, the 
Court vacated the Sixth Circuit opinion and found that “[t]o get citizenship 
unlawfully… is to get it through an unlawful means— and that is just 
to say that an illegality played some role in its acquisition.”16 This 
standard echoes the materiality standard we see from the Ninth Circuit in 
Puerta.17  
 This Note uses these denaturalization cases to examine the importance 
of citizenship and the role of ideology, language, and the tools of statutory 
interpretation in assessing the meaning of a statute. Ultimately, this Note 
suggests that while looking to the plain language may be a first step in 
interpreting statutes, it cannot and should not be the end of the analysis 
when doing so stands in conflict with prior cases and discounts the 
practical repercussions faced by those found in violation of the statute. 
Part II of this Note begins with a look at citizenship and its importance. 
This is followed by an overview of the legislative and judicial history of 
denaturalization. This history includes the origins of denaturalization in 
the United States, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,18 the 
relevant denaturalization statutes, and Kungys v. United States.19 Part II 
then goes on to discuss circuit court decisions in United States v. Puerta, 
Maslenjak I, and the Supreme Court opinion in Maslenjak II.  Part II 
concludes with a discussion of principles of statutory interpretation.   
Part III situates the circuit courts’ holdings in Puerta and Maslenjak I in 
the broader context and examines the role that statutory interpretation 
played in the Supreme Court’s approach to resolving the circuit split.  
Part IV suggests that an alternative approach looking to the purpose and 
 
15. 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
16. Id. at 1925. 
17. Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1303 (defining the test for materiality in a denaturalization as occurring 
when “misrepresentation or concealment had a ‘natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the 
applicant was qualified for citizenship.’” (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 783-84) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
18. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
19. 485 U.S. 759 (1988). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
BALOGUN NOTE  6/25/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
346 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:343 
 
 
effects of the statute played a role in the interpretation of § 1425(a) and 
could be helpful in resolving similar inquires in future cases. 
 
 
I. HISTORY 
 
A. Citizenship 
 
Citizenship is “the status of being a citizen” or the “quality of a person’s 
conduct as a member of a community.”20 These two definitions highlight 
the status and relational elements of citizenship. But why does status as a 
citizen matter?  
Since the nineteenth century, our conception of human rights has 
become progressively and almost exclusively linked to citizenship.21 This 
contributes to citizenship often being viewed as a preferable condition; 
“the highest fulfillment of democratic and egalitarian aspiration.”22 
Citizenship has been characterized as “the right to have rights.”23 Under 
the current law of the United States, some rights are associated exclusively 
with citizenship.24 Citizens cannot be deported.25 Voting rights are only 
available to citizens.26 These rights, available exclusively through one’s 
 
20. Citizenship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
21. BEN HERZOG, REVOKING CITIZENSHIP: EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL ERA 
TO THE WAR ON TERROR 16 (2015). 
22. Linda Bosniak, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 1 
(2006) (arguing that while common, this romantic portrayal of citizenship obscures the questions of 
inclusion and exclusion inherent in defining a group as belonging). 
23. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Remove this priceless 
possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. 
He has no lawful claim to protection from any nation. ...”).  
24. Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 
1571, 1581 (2012) (arguing that the main significance of citizenship today is the right to vote and the 
right to remain) See also Jon B. Hultman, Administrative Denaturalization: Is There “Nothing You 
Can Do That Can’t Be (Un)done”?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 895, 898-902 (2001) (describing how the 
desirability of citizenship can be seen in the backlog of individuals trying to become citizens through 
naturalization programs). 
25. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Beyond Citizenship: American Citizenship After Globalization. by 
Peter J. Spiro, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 180 (2009) (book review) (for a discussion on alienage, strict 
scrutiny and the distinctions drawn between the alien and the citizen, notably the right to not to be 
deported). 
26. Id. at 186. “[T]he virtually indefeasible right to remain where you have a home, ties, and a 
livelihood, while invisible to most citizens, is what makes the status irreplaceable, and what leads to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/17
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status as citizen, support the statement that “citizenship sits atop a 
hierarchy of legal statuses respecting membership in the nation state.”27 
Citizenship has value and the right to acquire it “is a precious one.”28  
 
A. Origins of Denaturalization in the United States 
 
In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt, responding to a flawed 
immigration system riddled with widespread abuses and lacking any real 
safeguards, pointed Congress towards the need for uniform legislation 
regarding the processes and proceedings of naturalization and 
denaturalization.29 Congress has the power to grant and withhold the 
privilege of citizenship and the rights associated with it.30 Roosevelt called 
“for the immediate attention of the Congress,” and for “a comprehensive 
revision of the naturalization laws.”31 This call to action both echoed and 
augured the concerns of forgeries in naturalization that would remain 
throughout the early nineteenth century.32 In March 1905, “Roosevelt 
 
spikes in naturalization when immigration laws start to constrict.” Id. at 186-87. 
27. Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 
1571 (2012). 
28. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (“[O]ur decisions have recognized that 
the right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one, and that, once citizenship has been 
acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling consequences.”); see also Lapp, supra note 25, at 
1580 (“Congress has called it ‘the most valued governmental benefit of this land.’” (quoting the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Naturalization Amendments of 1989, H. Rep. No. 101-187, at 14 (1989))).  
29. Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Snap: How the Moral Elasticity of the Denaturalization 
Statute Goes Too Far, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637, 648 (2015). See also PATRICK WEIL, THE 
SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 15-29 (2013). 
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Article I provides that “Congress shall have the power . . . 
[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
(Concerning the ability of Congress to prohibit “migration and importation of such persons as any of 
the states now existing shall think proper to admit.”). 
31. Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1904), available at 
http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545; see also Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 643 (1953). 
32. Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903), available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544. See also United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 324 (1917) (where the court 
stated “wide-spread frauds in naturalization . . . were, in large measure due to the great diversities in 
local practice, the carelessness of those charged with duties in this connection, and the prevalence of 
perjured testimony in cases.”). The Court in Ness further noted a workable remedy would include: 
“uniformity and strict enforcement of the law [that] could not be attained unless the Code prescribed 
also the exact character of proof to be adduced.” Id. 
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appointed a commission to further investigate this proposal,” and “[t]he 
Purdy Commission delivered its report on November 8, 1905.”33 This led 
to the Naturalization Act of 1906, a comprehensive revision and 
standardization of naturalization law.34 
The Naturalization Act of 1906 created uniform guidelines for 
naturalization proceedings across the United States.35 Congress provided 
the Government with the statutory power to file suits cancelling 
naturalization certificates obtained through “fraud” or “illegal 
procurement.”36 The judicial denaturalization procedure instituted by the 
Act “remains substantially intact to this day;” allowing the appropriate 
United States Attorney to file a civil complaint “upon affidavit showing 
good cause therefore.”37 The 1906 Act provided for both the acquisition of 
citizenship and the process of removing citizenship rights if they were 
found to be inappropriately attained.38  
 
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA or The Act)39 is the 
federal law regulating immigration in the United States. The INA was 
passed following a four-year investigation by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee into the then existing immigration and naturalization laws.40 
 
33. See WEIL, supra note 29, at 17. 
34. Naturalization of Aliens Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596 (1906). 
35. Id. See also WEIL, supra note 29, at 20-22. 
36. Naturalization of Aliens Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596, 601 (1906). 
37. Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1100 (9th Cir.  2000) (en banc) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(internal citation omitted) (describing the statutory scheme). 
38. 34 Stat. 596, 601. See also Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 241 (1912) (stating “An 
alien has no moral nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or 
the like, an imposition has been practised upon the court, without which the certificate of citizenship 
could not and would not have been issued.”). 
39. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
40. 99 CONG. REC. 1517 (1953) (Statement of Sen. McCarran): 
It was learned during the course of the Senate subcommittee’s 4-year investigation that the 
pattern of our old immigration system had been established not only by 2 comprehensive 
immigration laws, but by over 200 additional legislative enactments. . .. The immigration 
laws, were moreover, so closely intertwined with the naturalization laws that it was essential 
for the two sets of laws to be considered together. . .. It was, therefore, decided to draft one 
complete omnibus bill which would embody all of the immigration and naturalization laws. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/17
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The Act reflects a comprehensive undertaking by Congress in an attempt 
to control immigration. Concerns about the admissibility of those seeking 
entry into the country and the honesty of how said admissibility is 
procured underlie the provisions of the INA.41 These concerns are echoed 
in the Act’s inclusion of a framework for a denaturalization proceeding.42  
Prior to the enactment of the INA, denaturalization occurred only if the 
original naturalization decree was obtained by “fraud” or “illegal 
procurement.”43 Today’s provisions mirror this idea by allowing for 
denaturalization if the citizenship was “illegally procured” or “procured by 
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation,”44 or in 
cases where someone “knowingly procures . . . contrary to law. . . 
naturalization or of citizenship. . ..”45 
 
C. The Denaturalization Statutes 
 
There are two provisions which lay out the conditions under which a 
naturalized person can have their citizenship revoked: 8 U.S.C. § 1451, 
Revocation of Naturalization,46 and 18 U.S.C. § 1425, Procurement of 
Citizenship or Naturalization Unlawfully.47 The first provision appears in 
the INA as codified in Title 8 of the United States Code which governs 
Aliens and Nationality. It reads:  
 
41. Shari B. Gersten, United States v. Kungys: Clarifying the Materiality Standard in 
Denaturalization Proceedings, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 429, 435 (1989) (“In short, the legislative history of 
section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is strong evidence of Congress’ intent 
to discourage individuals seeking naturalization from making false statements on their applications.”). 
42. 66 Stat. at 260-63. See Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544. 
Forgeries and perjuries of shameless and flagrant character have been perpetrated, not only in 
the dense centers of population, but throughout the country; and it established beyond doubt 
that very many so called citizens of the United States have no title whatever to that right and 
are asserting and enjoying benefits of the same through the grossest frauds. 
43. Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 719 (1953) 
(discussing the impact of legislative, judicial, and administrative action prior to 1952 and whether the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 suitably resolves the then existing problems).  
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012). See also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493 (1981). 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012). 
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1451. 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1425. 
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It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective 
districts . . . to institute proceedings in any district court of the 
United States in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen 
may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking 
and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and 
canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such 
order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or 
were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful 
misrepresentation. . ..48 
This section sets out the process by which a person can face a civil 
denaturalization hearing. A United States attorney must bring proceedings 
in a district court on the ground that the naturalization was illegally 
procured or involved concealment of a material fact or willful 
misrepresentation.49 
The second section, § 1425, governing denaturalization is found in Title 
18 of United States Code which addresses crimes and criminal 
procedure.50 It states “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to 
procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary 
or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship; . . . Shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned. . . or both.” 51While the “statute does not 
define contrary to law. . . the phrase has been interpreted to be the law 
governing naturalization.”52 In addition to the possibility of fines and 
imprisonment described above, a criminal conviction under 1425 
automatically results in the revocation of naturalization outlined in 
8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).53 A person convicted under the criminal statute is 
automatically denaturalized.54 The court which has jurisdiction over the 
 
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (emphasis added).  
49. Id. 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). 
51. Id.  
52. United States v. Agunbiade, No. 98-4581, 1999 WL 26937, *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 1999) (internal 
quotations omitted) (affirming the lower court decision that a misrepresentation about a prior 
deportation is material). 
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e). 
54. Id. (“When a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of title 18 of knowingly procuring 
naturalization in violation of law, the court in which such conviction is had shall thereupon revoke, set 
aside, and declare void the final order admitting such person to citizenship, and shall declare the 
certificate of naturalization of such person to be canceled.”) (emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/17
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criminal proceeding also has adjudicative power over the denaturalization 
hearing.55  
 
 
 
D. Kungys v. United States 
 
In early 1980, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
instituted denaturalization proceedings in the District Court of New Jersey 
against Jouzas Kungys.56 Kungys had applied for an immigration visa 
while living in Germany in 1947, arrived in the United States in 1948 and 
became a citizen in 1954.57  He had been residing in America since then.58 
Subsequent to his acquiring citizenship and establishing a life in the 
United States, the Government became aware that Kungys had lied in the 
process of obtaining his visa and later his naturalization.59  
The Government sought Kungys’ denaturalization before the Supreme 
Court on two grounds.60 First, they argued that he had violated 8 U.S.C. § 
 
55. Id. (“Jurisdiction is conferred on the courts having jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to 
make such adjudication.”). 
56. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 764 (1988). “As its principal basis for revocation, the 
INS initially alleged that Kungys participated in the massacre of 2500 unarmed Jewish 
civilians…during World War II.” Kirsten Aasen, Comment, United States v. Kungys, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 387 (1989). The depositions on which they relied were held inadmissible so the INS instead 
claimed that misstatements in his application constituted concealment of material facts. Id. at 388-89. 
57. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 764. 
58. At the time of the proceeding he was living in Clifton, N.J. as a retired dental technician. Stuart 
Taylor Jr., Justices Question Bid to Denaturalize Man Who Lied on Past, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, 
ht 
tp://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/28/us/justices-question-bid-to-denaturalize-man-who-lied-on-past.htm 
l. 
59. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 802 (“These false statements concerned his date and place of birth, his 
wartime occupations, and his wartime residence: petitioner added two years to his age and misstated 
the city in which he was born, listed various occupations that he was engaged in from 1942 to 1947 
without listing that he was a bookkeeper for several of those years, and swore that he had resided in 
another city rather than in Kedainiai at the time these atrocities occurred. The District Court found that 
petitioner had indeed made these misrepresentations, but that they were immaterial under 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a) because the true facts, if known, would not themselves have warranted denial of a visa and 
would not have led to an investigation.”). 
60. Id. at 764-66. The Government had three asserted grounds at the District Court Level. See 
United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983), rev’d, 793 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 
485 U.S. 759 (1988). The Third Circuit declined to pass on the first asserted ground thus only two 
grounds were heard by the Supreme Court. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 766. 
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1451(a) because “in applying for his visa and in his naturalization petition, 
Kungys had made false statements with respect to his date and place of 
birth, wartime occupations, and wartime residence.”61 Second, the 
government “argued that Kungys’ citizenship had been “illegally 
procured” under § 1451(a) because when he was naturalized he lacked the 
good moral character mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).”62 In support of 
their second argument, the Government asserted that regardless of their 
materiality, Kungys’ false representations sufficiently showed that he had 
given “false testimony to obtain immigration or naturalization benefits, 
which § 1101(f)(6)63 makes determinative of lack of good moral 
character.”64 
In addressing the first ground for denaturalization asserted by the 
Government, the Court looked to the INA which provides for the 
denaturalization of citizens whose naturalizations were “illegally procured 
or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful 
misrepresentation.”65 The Court developed a standard for materiality under 
§ 1451(a) which required that in order for a misrepresentation to be 
 
61. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 764. 
62. Id. at 765. The statute at the time required that  
[n]o person . . . shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date 
of filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five 
years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein 
for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State in which the 
petitioner filed the petition for at least six months, (2) has resided continuously within the 
United States from the date of the petition up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) 
during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral 
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well 
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.  
8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The requirements as to good moral character remain 
unchanged in the current provision. See § 1427(a) (2012). 
63. “For the purposes of this chapter . . . No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of 
good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be 
established, is, or was . . . one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits 
under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2012) (date of edition consulted). 
64. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 765. The opinion goes on to explain that this lack of materiality 
requirement can be explained by looking to the primary purpose of the statute. Id. at 780. Unlike § 
1451(a), the purpose of § 1101(f)(6) is not “to prevent false pertinent data from being introduced into 
the naturalization process” but rather to identify lack of good moral character. Id.  
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
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material it must have “had a natural tendency to influence the decision[s of 
the INS].”66 In defining this standard, the Court looked to materiality 
requirements in the criminal context, specifically perjury.67 The Court 
looked to Blackstone who determined that in order to be punishable, a 
false statement “must be in some point material to the question in dispute,” 
not merely  “some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is 
paid.”68 Noting that this was a denaturalization proceeding, the Court 
supported their application of the criminal conceptualization of materiality 
in this case stating, “[w]hile we have before us here a statute revoking 
citizenship rather than imposing criminal fine or imprisonment, neither the 
evident objective sought to be achieved by the materiality requirement, nor 
the gravity of the consequences that follow from its being met, is so 
different as to justify adoption of a different standard.”69 
Regarding the first suggested reason for denaturalization, the Court 
ultimately held that though Kungys had made false statements as to his 
date and place of birth in his visa and naturalization applications, the 
misrepresentations were not material within the meaning of § 1451.70 
 
E. United States v. Puerta 
 
United States v. Puerta71 is a Ninth Circuit decision which relied on the 
reasoning of the Court in Kungys to evaluate whether § 1425(a) required 
that false statements be material.72 Antonio Medina Puerta, entered the 
United States on a student visa in 1981 and was admitted as a permanent 
resident in 1984.73 In the process of filling out his paperwork, and again 
 
66. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771. 
67. Id. at 769-70. The court found that the term “material” was “not a hapax legomenon.” Id. at 769.  
The court went on to state “Perjury is a crime committed, when a lawful oath is ministred by any that 
hath authority, to any person, in any judicial proceeding, who sweareth absolutely, and falsly in a 
matter material to the issue, or cause in question, by their own act, or by the subornation of others.” Id. 
(citing 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 164 (6th ed. 1680)).  
68. Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137). 
69. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770. 
70. Id. at 760. In doing so the court rejected the materiality analyses lower courts had used after the 
Supreme Courts holding in Chaunt v. United States. 380 U.S. 350 (1960). See Aasen, supra note 53, at 
389-97. 
71. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992). 
72. Id. at 1301-1305. 
73. Id. at 1298. 
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when he was interviewed by an INS agent, Puerta said that he had never 
gone by any other names and that he had not left the U.S. since entering 
for permanent residence, it was later shown that this was not the case.74 In 
fact, Puerta had been utilizing several identities.75  
Puerta was indicted by a grand jury for unlawful procurement of 
citizenship under § 1425.76 After a two-day bench trial, the court convicted 
Puerta finding that he had testified falsely when questioned by the INS 
agent.77 Puerta’s certificate of naturalization was voided pursuant to 
§1451(f), which mandates this step after a conviction under § 1425.78 The 
Ninth Circuit faced a question of first impression: whether § 1425(a) 
required that false statements made to procure naturalization be material in 
order to be “contrary to law.” 79 
The court looked to the materiality requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a) and then looked to Kungys, the leading case on denaturalization.80 
The court read a materiality requirement into criminal denaturalization 
proceedings under § 1425(a),81 presenting a standard that would be 
followed by many district courts subsequently.82 Ultimately, the court 
found that the false statements in this case did rise to the level of 
materiality.  
 
 
 
 
74. Id. at 1299.  
Question 5 asked him to list ‘[a]ny other names you have used (including maiden).’ Puerta 
left this space blank. Questions 27 and 28 asked him to list any absences from the United 
States (for less or more than six months, respectively) since the time he entered for permanent 
residence. He wrote ‘None’ in response to both questions. 
Id. Several months after his naturalization, Puerta attempted to deposit a check made out to Anthony 
Port in an account in the name of Anthony Simon. Id.  
75. Id. Proof of these identities included Massachusetts driver’s licenses in the names Anthony 
Simon, Anthony Port and Medina Puerta, Spanish driver’s licenses in the names Anthony Port Martin 
and Antonio Simon Palmer. Id. 
76. Id. at 1299. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 1299-1300. 
79. Id. at 1301. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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F. United States v. Maslenjak 
 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the same issue presented in Puerta in 
United States v. Maslenjak (Maslenjak I).83 Divna Maslenjak began her 
immigration process in Bosnia after the fall of Yugoslavia.84 Maslenjak 
stated under oath that both she and her family feared persecution in Bosnia 
because her husband had not served in the war.85 The family was granted 
refugee status in 1999.86  Maslenjak applied for citizenship in 2006.87 
Later, a series of circumstances led to the revelation that her husband 
actually had served in the war.88  
A grand jury indicted Maslenjak with one count of knowingly procuring 
her naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).89 At 
trial, a jury found that Maslenjak was guilty of procuring her 
naturalization contrary to law under § 1425(a).90 The Sixth Circuit was 
confronted with the question of whether § 1425(a) contained a materiality 
requirement.91 The court found that it did not.92 Utilizing principles of 
 
83. 821 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
84. Id. at 679. Maslenjak and her family met with “an officer with the United States Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. . . to seek refugee status based on their fear of persecution in their home 
region of Bosnia.” Id. 
85. Id. at 680. 
86. Id.  
87. Id. 
88. Id. Charges were brought against Maslenjak’s husband he was criminally convicted. Id. at 681 
Because his criminal conviction made him subject to removal, Ratko Maslenjak was taken 
into ICE custody on January 13, 2009 asylum hearing. During her testimony Maslenjak 
admitted that her husband had served in the Republic Srpska military, that they had in fact 
lived together in Bosnia after 1992, and that she had lied to the immigration officer about 
these facts during the refugee application interview in 1998. 
89. Id.  
The indictment alleged that Maslenjak ‘made material false statements’ on her Form N–400 
Application for Naturalization by answering ‘no’ to the questions about ‘knowingly giv[ing] 
false or misleading information to any U.S. government official while applying for any 
immigration benefit’ and ‘[lying] to any U.S. government official to gain entry or admission 
into the United States’ and then giving the same false answers during her interview for 
naturalization. 
90. Id. “Upon her conviction, the district court sentenced Maslenjak to two years’ probation and 
granted the government’s motion to have Maslenjak’s naturalization revoked under 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(e).” Id.  
91. Id. at 682. 
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statutory interpretation, the Sixth Circuit looked to the plain language and 
found that there was no statutory support for a conclusion of materiality.93 
The Sixth Circuit also expressly denied the option of utilizing the 
reasoning in Puerta.94 They found that Puerta and its line of cases 
overlooked the fact that Congress has “created a two-track system for 
denaturalization.”95 The court further reasoned that while the extra 
protection afforded by a materiality standard was needed in the civil 
context, the procedural safe-guards inherent in the criminal context made a 
materiality requirement an unnecessary protection.96 
 
G. Maslenjak v. United States 
 
In Maslenjak v. United States (Maslenjak II) the Supreme Court 
resolved the circuit split existing between the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Puerta and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Maslenjak I. 97 The decision, an 
appeal from the Sixth Circuit decision arose from the same facts 
concerning Dvina Maslenjak, the misrepresentation made during her 
naturalization process, and the Government’s efforts to convict and 
denaturalize her under § 1425(a).98 The Court looked to what the 
 
92. Id.  
93. Id. “A plain reading of the statute suggests that materiality is not an element of the offense. ‘The 
definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of 
federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.’” Id. (quoting Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 
7 (2006)). 
94. Maslenjak I, 821 F.3d at 686-87. 
95. Id. at 683.  
Denaturalization under § 1451(a) is a civil proceeding with its own evidentiary standard and 
shifting burden of proof; whereas, denaturalization under § 1451(e) is a mandatory ministerial 
act following a criminal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). There is little justification for 
reading an implied element of materiality into 18 U.S.C. § 1425 based on the fact that 
materiality is a required element for civil denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 
Id.  
96. Id.  at 691-92. “So in a criminal prosecution under § 1425, the Constitution itself cures any 
concerns about the ‘gravity of the consequences’ of mandatory denaturalization without requiring 
proof of materiality.” Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
97. 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
98. Maslenjak II, 137 S. Ct. at 1923.  
Maslenjak explained that the family feared persecution in Bosnia from both sides of the 
national rift. Muslims, she said, would mistreat them because of their ethnicity. And Serbs, 
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Government must prove in order to obtain a conviction under § 1425(a).99 
The Court ultimately held that the Government must establish that an 
illegal act played some role in her acquisition of citizenship.100 When the 
illegal act is a false statement, “that means demonstrating that the 
defendant lied about facts that would have mattered to an immigration 
official, because they would have justified denying naturalization or would 
predictably have led to other facts warranting that result.”101 
The Court held that for an individual to be denaturalized, the false 
statement made must have been one that could have justifiably lead to the 
denial of naturalization.102 The statement, in essence, must have been 
material. In reaching this conclusion the Court looked to the text of the 
statute.103 Citing Webster’s and Black’s Dictionary, the Court noted that 
“[i]n ordinary usage, “to procure” something is “to get possession of” 
it.”104 The Court then goes on to explain: 
to “procure ... naturalization” means to obtain naturalization … The 
adverbial phrase “contrary to law,” wedged in between “procure” 
 
she testified, would abuse them because her husband had evaded service in the Bosnian Serb 
Army by absconding to Serbia—where he remained hidden…Six years later, Maslenjak 
applied for naturalization. Question 23 on the application form asked whether she had ever 
given ‘false or misleading information’ to a government official while applying for an 
immigration benefit…whether she had ever ‘lied to a [ ] government official to gain entry or 
admission to the United States.’.... Maslenjak answered ‘no’ … But Maslenjak’s professions 
of honesty were false. 
Id.; see supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.  
99. Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017). 
100. Id. at 1923-25.  
The most natural understanding is that the illegal act must have somehow contributed to the 
obtaining of citizenship. Consider if someone said to you: “John obtained that painting 
illegally.” You might imagine that he stole it off the walls of a museum. Or that he paid for it 
with a forged check. Or that he impersonated the true buyer when the auction house delivered 
it. But in all events, you would imagine illegal acts in some kind of means-end relation—or 
otherwise said, in some kind of causal relation—to the painting’s acquisition. If someone said 
to you, “John obtained that painting illegally, but his unlawful acts did not play any role in his 
obtaining it,” you would not have a clue what the statement meant. You would think it 
nonsense—or perhaps the opening of a riddle. 
101. Id. at 1923. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1924. 
104. Id.  
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and “naturalization,” then specifies how a person must procure 
naturalization so as to run afoul of the statute: in contravention of 
the law—or, in a word, illegally. Putting the pieces together, 
someone “procure[s], contrary to law, naturalization” when she 
obtains citizenship illegally.105  
The illegality must play a role in the acquisition of citizenship.106 The 
Court rejected the view that the statute merely requires that a violation of 
law occur in the course of procuring naturalization as “falter[ing] on the 
way language naturally works.”107 There must be a causal, not a 
coincidental, connection between the violation of law and the obtained 
citizenship.108 The effect of allowing coincidental connections would be to 
“[open] the door to a world of disquieting consequences.”109 
 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
The Supreme Court has found that the first step in finding the meaning 
of a statute is looking at the language.110 The preliminary inquiry is into 
the plainness of language, if the language is plain, it should be enforced as 
 
105. Id. at 1924-25. 
106. Id. (“To get citizenship unlawfully, we understand, is to get it through an unlawful means—and 
that is just to say that an illegality played some role in its acquisition.”). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 1926.  
Suppose that an applicant for citizenship fills out the necessary paperwork in a government 
office with a knife tucked away in her handbag (but never mentioned or used). She has 
violated the law—specifically, a statute criminalizing the possession of a weapon in a federal 
building. See 18 U.S.C. § 930. And she has surely done so ‘in the course of’ procuring 
citizenship. But would you say, using English as you ordinarily would, that she has 
“procure[d]” her citizenship ‘contrary to law’ (or, as you would really speak, “illegally”)? 
Once again, no. That is because the violation of law and the acquisition of citizenship are in 
that example merely coincidental: The one has no causal relation to the other. 
109. Id. at 1927.  
But under the Government’s reading of § 1425(a), a lie told in the naturalization process—
even out of embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy—would always provide a basis for 
rescinding citizenship. The Government could thus take away on one day what it was required 
to give the day before. 
110. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
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is.111 However, if such enforcement would lead to an absurd result, courts 
should look beyond the plain language.112 
 The Supreme Court applied this rule in the context of false statements 
in United States v. Wells.113 In determining whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014 
contained a materiality requirement, 114 the Court first looked to the text.115 
Section 1014 “criminalizes ‘knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or 
report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action’ of a 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured bank.” 116 The 
Court cited Kungys for the premise that “the term ‘false statement’ carries 
no general suggestion of influential significance.”117 The Court also 
examined the common law meaning of the statutory language and found 
that the respondents failed to show that “false statement” carries with it a 
meaning acquired under common law that would require reading in 
materiality.118 After Wells, an analysis of plain meaning requires two 
steps:  first, look to the natural reading119 and then look to whether any 
words carry a meaning from the common law.120  
In Puerta, the Ninth Circuit finds rather summarily that 18 U.S.C. § 
 
111. Id. (“[T]he meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which 
the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms.”). 
112. 2A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 
(7th ed. 2007).  
A court may look beyond the plain language of a statute when: applying the language 
according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result, or there is ‘obvious’ or ‘clear’ 
evidence of contrary legislative intent; it finds ‘a specific indication to the contrary;’ it finds 
‘compelling reasons to hold otherwise;’ some other section of an act expands or restricts its 
meaning, or a particular provision is repugnant to an act’s general purview, or other acts in 
pari materia, or the relevant legislative history, imports a different meaning. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
113. 519 U.S. 482 (1997).  
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012). 
115. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490. 
116. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014).  
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 491. 
119. Id. at 483, 492. (“[s]tatutory history confirms the natural reading.”).  
120. Id. at 491. (“We do, of course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-law meaning of 
the terms it uses...”); See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1999) (applying the Wells 
framework to 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and finding that the word “fraud” contains a meaning at common law 
which connotes materiality and as such, there is a materiality requirement in this provision.). 
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1425(a) has a materiality requirement.121 The court simply states that 
support for the position is found in Kungys and then moves on to apply the 
materiality standard Kungys outlines.122 While the court acknowledges it is 
addressing a different statute,123 it fails to provide an independent rationale 
for why the Supreme Court decision regarding one statute, 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a), should necessarily govern the distinct statute in question, 
18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). 
Looking to the analysis of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) in Kungys does not fully 
resolve why we should read in a materiality standard. Because § 1451(a) 
expressly contains the word material,124 the Supreme Court focused on 
interpreting, clarifying and applying a materiality standard rather than 
determining whether one should be included as a preliminary matter.125 
The questions of law, approaches to answering said questions, and the 
statutes themselves are unique; it does not follow that the Kungys decision 
should govern the 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) materiality question. One justifiable 
reason for relying on Kungys is that the statutes, while different, address 
the same issue, denaturalization.126 
The overreliance of the Ninth Circuit on Kungys is of particular concern 
in light of the rules of statutory construction. The Ninth Circuit fails to 
analyze § 1425(a) of its own accord.127 In doing so the Ninth Circuit 
 
121. Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1301. 
No reported cases discuss whether § 1425(a) requires that false statements made to procure 
naturalization be material in order to be “contrary to law.” We note, however, that 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a) permits denaturalization if citizenship was “procured by concealment of a material 
fact or by willful misrepresentation” (emphasis added). Further, the government agrees with 
Puerta that § 1425(a) implies a materiality requirement similar to the one used in the 
denaturalization context. This position finds support in Kungys . . ..  
Id.  
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1995) (allowing for denaturalization if citizenship is “procured by 
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”). 
125. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 769-71. 
126. Given that Kungys was and still is considered “the leading denaturalization case” it makes sense 
for the Ninth Circuit to rely on the Kungys decision. Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1301. 
127. The Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak I criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s Puerta decision on several bases. 
Maslenjak v. United States, 821 F.3d 675, 686-93 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). The 
Sixth Circuit expresses particular concern over the failure of the Ninth circuit to apply the rules of 
statutory construction. Id. at 689. 
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ignores the fact that there are two denaturalization statutes; “Congress has 
created a two-track system for denaturalization.”128 While each statute 
covers denaturalization, the statutes are unique and should be analyzed as 
such. 
The rules of statutory construction make clear that a court should first 
look to the plain language. The Sixth Circuit remedied a major flaw in the 
Ninth Circuit approach by looking to the plain language.129 The Court 
finds that there is no materiality requirement.130 At a basic level of 
interpretation, this rings true. The word material does not appear in the 
text of § 1425(a).131   
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit’s consideration of a “natural reading” of 
the plain language is lacking. The court does not address whether any of 
the terms in the statute carry with them a materiality standard from the 
common law.132 The court does address alternative reasons for reading in a 
materiality requirement before dismissing them.133 The court concludes 
that the procedural safe-guards inherent in the criminal context make a 
materiality requirement an unnecessary protection.134 This conclusion 
however, seems to downplay the severity of denaturalization as a 
punishment and overemphasize the protections of criminal courts. The 
court addresses the severity of denaturalization as a matter of equity 
stating,  
the only compelling reason left to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
materiality in Puerta is the equity of mandatory denaturalization on 
anything less than proof of a materially false statement. . . denaturalization 
is a “unique” and “severe” sanction amounting to “banishment,” and so 
the same evidentiary standard should apply whether the government seeks 
denaturalization in a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding.135   
 
128. Maslenjak I, 821 F.3d at 680. 
129. Id. at 690. 
130. Id. at 682. “A plain reading of the statute suggests that materiality is not an element of the 
offense.”  
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012). 
132. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
133. Maslenjak I, 821 F.3d at 685-93. 
134. Id. at 691-92. “So in a criminal prosecution under § 1425, the Constitution itself cures any 
concerns about the ‘gravity of the consequences’ of mandatory denaturalization without requiring 
proof of materiality.” Id. at 692. (quoting Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1301). 
135. Maslenjak I, 821 F.3d at 691. 
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The court describes this reason as “compelling” but proceeds to dismiss 
it looking instead to only the plain language.136 This dismissal can be seen 
as a weakness in the Sixth Circuit approach. While the plain language is 
the start of statutory interpretation, it is not the final step.137 The Sixth 
Circuit overly relies on the plain language and summarily dismisses other 
“compelling” rationales for reading in a materiality requirement. 
In resolving the split, the Supreme Court starts with the text of the 
statute.138 But unlike the Sixth Circuit which found the absence of the 
word “material” meant no materiality standard, the Court looks to both 
ordinary usage and a natural understanding.139 This approach is consistent 
the standard articulated in Wells, which requires one look to a natural 
reading.140 Statutory interpretation allows for the application of multiple 
approaches in order to assess meaning. 
The Supreme Court states a reliance on the text and language of the 
statute in reading in a causal relationship.141 However, in determining what 
constituted a natural understanding, the Court looks to the purpose and 
effect of § 1425(a). The Court looks to the effect of allowing non-causal 
illegal actions to lead to denaturalization.142 There are reasons both 
malicious and non-malicious for a person to lie. These lies can be both 
relevant and irrelevant to the naturalization process. Allowing someone to 
lose citizenship because they lied out of embarrassment, fear, or a desire 
for privacy especially when that lie would have no impact on their 
acquisition of citizenship is inconsistent with the purpose of § 1425(a).143 
Further such an interpretation produces unsettling effects for those who 
face denaturalization as a result of prosecution under the statute. 144  
 
 
136. Id. “Whatever appeal this rationale might have, the argument invites us to overlook the plain 
text of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and disregard the overall statutory scheme Congress has enacted for 
denaturalization under the INA.” Id. 
137. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
138. Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924 (2017) (“We begin, as usual, with the 
statutory text.”). 
139. Id. 
140. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
141. Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924-26 (2017). 
142. Id. at 1926-27. 
143. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra text note 108 and accompanying text. 
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III. PROPOSAL: THE IMPACT OF PURPOSE ON MEANING 
 
Citizenship has value and the right to acquire it is precious.145 As 
citizenship possesses such value, it follows that the processes by which we 
strip people of it much be treated as equally dear and evaluated with the 
utmost inquiry. Recognizing the need for such evaluation, the Supreme 
Court’s addressed the question of what § 1425(a) requires.146 
As outlined above, neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit 
approach completely elucidates whether a materiality requirement should 
be read into 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). In looking to answer this question it is 
necessary to look beyond Kungys’s § 1451(a) analysis and strict plain 
language interpretation. The Supreme Court resolves the inquiry by 
looking to a natural reading of the text of the statute. The ultimate 
conclusion is that procuring citizenship contrary to law must mean that the 
illegality was causal or material to the procurement.147   
It is this approach which looked beyond the text to what the text would 
mean Congress intended the effect would be which created a broader base 
from which the Court determined that § 1425(a) should have a materiality 
requirement and which can be helpful in future interpretation. 148  
Looking to purpose, section 1425(a) occupies a nexus: it is a criminal 
provision located within the federal criminal code, but it is also 
denaturalization provision. As such it carries with it two lines of 
jurisprudence and double the import of repercussions faced by those who 
are found in violation of it.149 The original goals of the INA included 
decreasing fraud and creating consistency.150 Concerns over consistency 
and accuracy in the naturalization purpose are still relevant today.  
Looking to effect, citizenship has value. As such, the Government 
 
145. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
146. Order Granting Certiorari, 16-309 Maslenjak v. United States (2017). 
147. See discussion supra Part II Section H. 
148. As the court recognized, “by so unmooring the revocation of citizenship from its award, the 
Government opens the door to a world of disquieting consequences—which this Court would need far 
stronger textual support to believe Congress intended. The statute Congress passed, most naturally 
read, strips a person of citizenship not when she committed any illegal act during the naturalization 
process, but only when that act played some role in her naturalization.” Maslenjak v. United States, 
137 S. Ct. 1918, 1921 (2017). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55. 
150. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
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“carries a heavy burden of proof in a proceeding to divest a naturalized 
citizen of his citizenship”; the loss of American citizenship can have 
“severe and unsettling consequences.”151 Statutory interpretation tells us 
that when the plain language leads to absurd results we should look 
beyond it. The Sixth Circuit in relying solely on the plain language, 
allowed for a regime under which a naturalized citizen could be 
denaturalized for having misrepresented their favorite color, or how 
pleasant their car ride to a meeting with the naturalization officer was. 
While these are extreme examples, taking away someone’s citizenship for 
either of these reasons would have been both consistent with the Sixth 
Circuit interpretation and absurd. Some scholars suggest that 
denaturalization is not a punishment but rather a resetting to the 
appropriate state in light of a flaw in the naturalization process.152 This 
reasoning makes sense if the flaw is material, but if it is not, it is hard to 
argue that stripping someone of citizenship is not a punishment, let alone 
that it is a punishment fitting the ‘crime.’ 
Looking to purpose and effect elucidates the natural reading of the text 
of the statute beyond the plain language and beyond the jurisprudence of 
prior courts. Given the importance of citizenship and the severity of 
denaturalization these added steps provided greater clarity in evaluating 
whether § 1425(a) contains a materiality requirement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing doctrinal and policy reasons the rationales applied in 
both the Ninth Circuit and Sixth Circuit cases are meritorious but also 
lacking. The Ninth Circuit in Puerta, identifies Kungys as the leading 
denaturalization case, but its failure to clarify its own rationale for using 
the standard governing one statute to evaluate another leaves it open to 
critique. The Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak I, clearly articulates its rationale 
for using the plain language approach to statutory interpretation but fails to 
fully consider the possible outcomes of such a reading. This note suggests 
 
151. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). 
152. Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 717 (1953) (“In 
theory a denaturalization judgment does not involve a penalty because the defendant is merely 
deprived of wrongfully procured citizenship and in law was never a citizen at all.”). 
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that while relying on Kungys alone is insufficient, it is equally inadequate 
to rely heavily on the plain language. Instead the Supreme Court’s 
approach of determining natural understanding by looking to the purpose 
and effect of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) the best resolution and framework for 
future cases. 
The earliest calls for federal immigration laws asked for consistency in 
process to address concerns of fraud and fairness.153 The Supreme Court in 
resolving the circuit split once more created consistency in the realm of 
immigration. 
 
 
153. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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